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Abstract: This paper discusses the proposed China-Georgia free trade agreement and 
provides quantitative estimates of its economic effects. The proposed free trade agreement 
would more than double trade flows between China and Georgia over a time horizon of ten 
to fifteen years, and would increase Georgian GDP per capita by about 1.5 percent. 
Chinese exports to Georgia would increase by about 20 to 30 percent, and Chinese GDP 
per capita would remain virtually unchanged. While these estimates have to be treated with 
extreme caution, they should serve as a motivation to continue negotiations on the free 
trade agreement. 
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I. Introduction 
Liu Junzhou from Guangdong province might have been the first Chinese investor in 
Georgia. Migrating to Adjara in 1890 he is credited with having introduced tea to Georgia, 
as the founder of the first tea plantation in the country (Zhou, 2012). Economic linkages 
between Georgia (respectively the Georgian SSR) and China were very weak during 
Soviet times and throughout the 1990s, but experienced strong growth, from a low base, in 
the 2000s. Today, China is one of the most important foreign investors in Georgia and one 
of Georgia’s most important trade partners. The future of China-Georgia economic 
relations is promising, as Georgia is a key partner for China’s “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative, in particular for the land based Silk Road Economic Belt component. Launched in 
2013, this initiative envisions connecting the major economies of Europe and Asia through 
trade, investment, and infrastructure. It is before this background that a free trade 
agreement between China and Georgia has been proposed, and is currently negotiated 
between the two governments. 
 
This paper will discuss the proposed free trade agreement and will provide quantitative 
estimates of its economic effects on the Georgian and Chinese economy. It is not the first 
paper on the proposed China-Georgia free trade agreement, as the Chinese and Georgian 
government commissioned a feasibility study, which was jointly prepared by a Chinese 
university and a Georgian consulting company (see PMCG and UIBE, 2015). This study 
focuses on the current legal and institutional environment underpinning trade and 
investment between China and Georgia. It also provides quantitative estimates from a 
computable general equilibrium model (CGE), based on the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP). 
 
The feasibility study finds only a modest impact of the proposed free trade agreement, with 
Georgian exports increasing by about thirty percent, corresponding to about 25 million 
US$. The effect on GDP is even smaller, with Georgian GDP increasing by 0.05 percent, 
corresponding to 7.5 million US$, and Chinese GDP increasing by negligible 0.0001 
percent, corresponding to about 5 million US$. Even accounting for the fact that CGE 
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models tend to underestimate the impact of free trade agreements, this is a very modest 
impact, standing in stark contrast to the findings of this paper. 
 
This paper improves upon the feasibility study in several ways. It is an independent study, 
with a focus on the economics of the free trade agreement, as opposed to the legal and 
institutional aspects. Its quantitative estimates are based on an econometric model, and 
not a CGE model. Leaving aside the question which model type is more suitable to 
estimate the impact of trade agreements,1 the CGE approach chosen by the feasibility 
study is problematic for two reasons. First, even the newest iteration of GTAP has only 
data from 2001. Given the structural changes the Georgian economy has experienced 
since the 2001 Rose Revolution, a CGE model based on a 2001 base year is unlikely to 
accurately predict the impact of the free trade agreement. Second, the feasibility study 
does not take into account reductions of non-tariff barriers, and the changes to economic 
policy and economic structure induced by the trade agreement. These reductions and 
changes are quantitatively important, but are difficult to measure directly. In contrast, the 
econometric approach of this paper, by construction, takes these reductions into account. 
 
Predicting the impact of future trade agreements pushes modern economics and 
quantitative modelling to its limits. Any modelling exercise suffers not only from data 
availability issues and the inherent limitations of economic models, but also from the long 
time horizons involved, the difficulty of quantifying reductions in non-tariff barriers, and the 
difficulty of predicting changes to policy and economic structure induced by the trade 
agreement. Thus neither the results of the feasibility study nor the results of this paper 
should be taken as precise and accurate predictions. 
 
The quantitative estimates on the impact of the proposed China-Georgia free trade 
agreement provided in this paper are based on the gravity model, adapted from the model 
in Fuenfzig (2015). Gravity model models are widely used in the literature to assess the 
impact of trade agreements, both ex-ante and ex-post. Gravity models have the advantage 
                                                            
1 For discussion and comparisons of gravity and CGE models in the analysis of trade agreements, see Piermartini and 
The (2005) or Ivus and Strong (2007). 
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of being able to take into account not only tariff reductions, but also reductions in non-tariff 
barriers, and changes to economic policy and economic structure induced by the trade 
agreement. 
 
We find that a free trade agreement between China and Georgia would double exports 
from Georgia to China, with little trade being diverted from other countries. This estimate 
implies a cumulative increase of GDP per capita by about 1.5 percent for Georgia. Chinese 
exports to Georgia increase by only about 20 to 30 percent, with virtually no trade diversion 
or changes to GDP per capita for China. These estimates are based on the implicit 
assumption that the China-Georgia free trade agreement will be comparable in scope and 
depth to existing free trade agreements. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes current trade and 
investment flows between China and Georgia, and describes existing trade barriers 
between the two countries. Section III describes the methodology and the data used, and 
section IV discusses the results of the econometric analysis. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for the current negotiations between the two governments. 
 
 
II. Economic Linkages between China and Georgia 
Current trade between China and Georgia is unbalanced, with Georgian imports from 
China far exceeding exports to China. It is likely that import figures (and to a lesser extent 
export figures) are slightly inflated due to re-exports of Chinese merchandise via Georgia 
not being properly recorded. The overwhelming majority of Georgia’s exports to China fall 
into the ores and metal sector. Agricultural and food products are also of importance, with 
all other sectors, including the service sector, being negligible. The structure of Georgia’s 
trade with China is roughly similar, at least at broad product categories, to Georgia’s 
overall trade structure with the rest of the world. At a more detailed level, within broad 
sectors, important exports to China are copper waste and scrap, refined copper and 
copper alloys, gold, and wine. There is no publicly available data on Chinese FDI in 
Georgia by sector, but anecdotal evidence suggests that most of Chinese FDI is focused 
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on mining, timber, energy and real estate, with one investor, the Hualing group, being the 
largest foreign investor in Georgia. 
 
Table 1: China-Georgia Trade (in Million US$) 
 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Exports to China 5.6 29.6 30.4 28.1 34.8 90.8 128.5 
Rank 23 15 14 16 17 8 6 
Imports from China 48.0 359.2 558.4 653.5 667.7 810.6 654.0 
Rank 15 4 4 3 2 2 2 
FDI from China 5.7 -7.9 9.6 36.1 89.9 217.9 57.6 
Rank 13 n/a 22 8 3 3 6 
Exports to China:        
Ores and Metals 4.5 19.1 26.0 19.9 28.9 85.0 n.a. 
Agriculture/Food 1.1 4.9 2.7 5.0 4.7 5.1 n.a. 
Manufactures  0.4 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.3 n.a. 
Note: Including SAR Hong Kong and SAR Macau, but not Chinese Taipei, Source: World Bank WITS 
 
Chinese exports to Georgia face very low applied and most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs. 
Most tariff lines are zero, no tariff rate is exceeding twelve percent, and the share of tariff 
lines with international peaks is zero. Average and weighted average tariffs are roughly 
around one percent, with the exception of agriculture, where China faces a simple and 
weighted average tariff rate of around six percent. At the same time there is considerable 
tariff overhang, as Georgia’s bound tariffs – while low by international standards - are 
relatively high compared to applied and MFN tariffs.2 This suggests that one possible 
motivation for China to enter a free trade agreement with Georgia is to reduce trade policy 
uncertainty. 
 
Georgia’s main exports to China – ores and metals – face very low applied tariff rates, 
while Georgia’s agricultural and manufacturing exports face relatively high tariffs. Still, 
given the preponderance of ores and metals in Georgia’s export bundle to China the tariff 
                                                            
2 That a small country such as Georgia choose a large tariff overhang is also suggested by the theory of optimal tariff 
bindings, see Beshkar, Bond and Rho (2015). 
6 
 
burden faced by current exports is very low. There is also little trade policy uncertainty, as 
tariff overhang on the Chinese side is minimal. 
 
Table 2: Chinese Tariff Rates on Imports from Georgia (in percentage terms, for 2014) 
 Simple 
Average 
Weighted 
Average 
Minimum 
Rate 
Maximum 
Rate 
Ores and Metals     
  Effectively Applied 1.4 0.0 0.0 7.0 
  Most Favored Nation 1.4 1.2 0.0 7.0 
  Bound Tariff 2.8 0.0 0.0 7.0 
Agriculture     
  Effectively Applied 16.9 14.2 0.0 40.0 
  Most Favored Nation 16.9 14.2 0.0 40.0 
  Bound Tariff 16.9 14.2 0.0 40.0 
Manufacturing     
  Effectively Applied 8.1 12.2 0.0 35.0 
  Most Favored Nation 8.1 12.2 0.0 35.0 
  Bound Tariff 8.4 12.3 0.0 35.0 
Source: UNCTAD-TRAINS 
 
All this does not imply that Georgia could not gain from further tariff reductions, either 
within the framework of the WTO or the proposed China-Georgia free trade agreement. In 
particular, Chinese tariff rates on categories in which Georgia has large exports to 
countries other than China can be relatively high. This includes beverages with a tariff rate 
of twenty percent and live animals with a tariff rate of ten percent. It is unclear to what 
extent high Chinese tariff rates or other factors such as transportation costs or lack of 
market demand are responsible for low exports to China in these categories. 
 
China also imposes a range of non-tariff barriers. Some of these, in particular anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing duties do not apply to Georgian exports. More important are 
sanitary, phytosanitary and technical barriers, which concern a significant range of product 
categories, but are difficult to quantify. Econometric estimates by Kee et al. (2009) suggest 
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that non-tariff barriers imposed by China are slightly above non-tariff barriers of developed 
countries, but are on par with developing country non-tariff barriers, on average. Non-tariff 
barriers tend to affect both fixed and variable trade costs, and depending on the relative 
magnitudes will affect trade mainly via the extensive or intensive margin. 
 
Table 3: Chinese Tariff Rates on  the ten most important Exports from Georgia, for 2014 (in million US$ respectively in percent) 
HS Code Commodity Trade Value Tariff Rate Notes 
310230 Fertilizers 137.61 1.0  
300490 Pharmaceutical 73.42 3.0 - 6.0  
610990 Apparel 35.38 1.0 / 14.0  
010229 Live bovine animals 30.07 10.0  
220210 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 28.43 20.0  
010410 Live sheep and goats 21.04 0.0 – 10.0  
100199 Wheat and meslin 12.08 1.0 / 65.0 quota regime 
401110 New pneumatic tyres 11.29 10.0  
300420 Pharmaceutical 9.70 6.0  
100590 Maize (corn) 6.81 1.0 / 65.0 quota regime 
Note: Excluding exports of motor vehicles, ores and metals, Source: UNCTAD-TRAINS 
 
Both China and Georgia are members of the World Trade Organization. No disputes have 
ever been filed between the two countries or included both countries. Both are also 
signatories of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), with minimal Article II 
(MFN) Exemptions. China and Georgia also signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 
1995. As a first generation treaty, it is relatively general and vague, and provides only for 
an ad hoc tribunal to settle disputes, outside the realm of institutional arbitration. 
 
This leaves a wide range of options for the proposed free trade agreement between China 
and Georgia, from a mere free trade agreement offering tariff concessions to a deep free 
agreement reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, 
harmonizing standards and regulations and facilitating bilateral investments. The former 
should be of little interest to China, given that Georgia has already low tariff rates across 
the board, but is of more interest to Georgia, given that some of its actual and potential 
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exports face high Chinese tariff rates. A deep free trade agreement, in contrast, offers 
promises to both countries. In the best case, a deep free trade agreement would be 
transformative, with Georgia becoming a hub for trade, investment and infrastructure 
linking China and Europe, leveraging Georgia’s geographical location and the existing 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between Georgia and the 
European Union. Unfortunately, it is exactly this transformative potential that makes it 
difficult to accurately predict the impact of the proposed free trade agreement.  
 
 
III. Methodology 
 
The estimation procedure closely follows Egger et al. (2011), building on the work of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baier and Bergstrand (2009), and Egger and Larch 
(2011). Egger et al. (2011) derive a structural gravity equation from a standard new trade 
theory model, and addresses the issues of the endogeneity of free trade agreements, zero 
trade flows, heteroscedasticity, and the general equilibrium effects of trade agreements. 
The structural gravity equation takes the form 
 ln𝑋𝑖𝑖 = �𝑍′𝑖𝑖𝛽 + 𝛾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + Ω𝑖 + Ρ𝑖0 , 
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes bilateral trade flows, 𝑍𝑖𝑖 is a vector of all gravity variables, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is a 
dummy that is one if both countries are in a free trade agreement, and Ω𝑖 and Ρ𝑖 are 
multilateral resistance terms. Following Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), this 
specification takes into account that for many country pairs trade will be zero. Bilateral 
trade costs are given by 
 (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 ln𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution and 𝜏𝑖𝑖 are bilateral trade costs. The gravity 
variables are bilateral distance between countries, common colonial past (including having 
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been part of the Soviet Union), common language, common legal origins, common border, 
sectoral shares in total value added (to capture the effect of economic structure on trade), 
and the World Bank Doing Business subindex trading across borders. To capture the effect 
of trade agreements on trade costs, trade agreements that are already in force are also 
included. This specification captures not only tariff reductions, but also other implications of 
trade agreements, in particular reductions of non-tariff barriers, changes to economic 
policy and economic structure induced by the trade agreement. 
 
Egger et al. (2011) solve for the extensive margin (the probability that trade flows are not 
zero) and the intensive margin (the value of trade flows), as a variation of the Heckman 
two-stage estimation procedure. The extensive margin is estimated as a probit model, with 
GDP per capita, legal origin and the World Bank Doing Business subindex on trading 
across borders as selection variables. The intensive margin is estimated as a gravity 
equation. To control for the log-concavity problem, the gravity equation is estimated with a 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (PPML), as proposed by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). 
 
To control for endogeneity and general equilibrium effects, the estimation proceeds in 
three stages. Endogeneity is a potential issue as the error term might include unobserved 
barriers to trade, with these barriers potentially prompting countries to negotiate trade 
agreements. General equilibrium effects have to be taken into account, as trade 
agreements will not only affect trade flows, but also GDP and multilateral resistance,3 
which in turn will feed back into trade flows. 
 
On the first stage both the gravity and the selection equation are estimated, while holding 
the effect of trade agreements constant, in order to control for endogeneity. The effect is 
fixed at the value of 236 percent found by Egger et al. (2011), hence implying that a free 
trade agreement will more than double trade flows, on average. As robustness check, 
alternative values from different papers have been used, ranging from 27 to 311 percent. 
                                                            
3 Given the small size of Georgia changes to the multilateral resistance terms of other countries are likely to be 
negligible. 
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These alternative specifications yield essentially the same end results. The multilateral 
resistance terms are estimated as importer respectively exporter fixed effects. On the 
second stage the results of the first stage are used to compute counterfactual multilateral 
resistance terms and GDP for all countries in the sample, as in Egger and Larch (2011). 
Lastly, on the third stage the gravity equation and the selection equation are re-estimated 
using the counterfactual resistance terms and GDPs, with the dummy variable 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 set to 
one for China and Georgia, and all countries that are part of a free trade agreement. 
 
To assess the potential impact of structural and policy change induced specifally by trade 
agreements with China, we also estimate the gravity equations for two separate groups of 
countries. The first group includes all countries that have a free trade agreement with 
China, the second group includes all other countries. This methodology follows Shepotylo 
(2010), and is based on the assumption that structural or policy changes induced by the 
trade agreements are reflected in the gravity coefficients and not just the gravity variables.4 
This approach has its limitations. In particular, it implicitly assumes that the effect of having 
a free trade agreement with China is identical across the countries in the sub-sample. This 
is a strong assumption, which is only partially mitigated by controlling for country-specific 
characteristics such as economic structure. 
 
Data on trade flows is taken from the UN Comtrade data base, data on distance, cultural 
and historical ties (i.e. common language, colonial ties, legal origin) from CEPII, on GDP 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators, and on sectoral shares from the 
UNIDO industrial data base. Data on free trade agreements is taken from the WTO 
Regional Trade Agreements database. The data covers 141 countries, with 2014 as base 
year for all data except sectoral shares. Owing to infrequent updates to the UNIDO 
industrial database, sectoral shares are based on data from 2012. 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 For example, a trade agreement will lower trade costs, which will be directly reflected in the gravity variables. At the 
same time, the trade agreement might also induce structural change. But with a different sectoral composition, trade 
flows will exhibit a different sensitivity to trade costs, and hence the gravity coefficients will change. 
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IV. Results 
 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates. The first two columns report estimates for the 
baseline estimation that makes no difference between countries that have and countries 
that do not have a free trade agreement with China. The third and fourth column report 
estimates for the intensive margin separately for countries with respectively without a free 
agreement with China. Not reported in the table are the extensive margin for the grouped 
regression, and the robustness checks with alternative values for the effect of free trade 
agreements. 
 
Table 4: Parameter Estimates 
 Intensive 
Margin 
Extensive 
Margin 
Intensive 
Margin, FTA 
with China 
Intensive 
Margin, No FTA 
with China 
FTA 0.85 0.02 0.91 0.81 
ln Distance -1.16 -0.91 -1.01 -0.93 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Land Border 0.31 -0.93 0.41 0.45 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.06) (0.07) 
Language 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.15 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Colonial Origin 0.36 0.22 0.28 0.33 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Observations 19734 19734 16499 3235 
Note: All specifications include separate fixed effects for exporting and importing countries. Cluster robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. No standard errors are reported for FTA, as the value was fixed 
at the value of other studies. 
 
The parameter estimates are broadly in line with the gravity literature. In particular, we find 
that before taking into account general equilibrium effects free trade agreements increase 
trade flows substantially, by almost one hundred percent. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the effect of free trade agreements on trade flows between 
countries in and countries not in a free trade agreement with China, implying that trade 
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agreements with China do not lead to structural or policy changes different than the 
changes induced by trade agreements with other countries. 
 
The parameter estimates can be used to compute counterfactual GDP, prices and hence 
real GDP per capita, using the functional relationship between trade costs, multilateral 
resistance terms, and prices and GDP in Egger and Larch (2011). These effects only 
materialize in the long-run, after about ten to fifteen years (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). 
 
While changes to trade flows and GDP per capita are reported as precise estimates, this 
should not be construed as offering anything but rough estimates of the possible effect of a 
China-Georgia free trade agreement. In particular, these estimates are based on the 
implicit assumption that in the ten to fifteen years it takes for the full effect to materialize, 
neither the Georgian nor the Chinese economy will experience any significant changes, 
such as new free trade agreements, changes to the trajectory of GDP growth, changes in 
technology that reduce trade costs, among many other possible changes. 
 
Table 5: Predicated Changes to Trade Flows and GDP per capita, in percent 
 Bilateral Exports Other Exports Real GDP per capita 
China    
  benchmark 24.7 0.0 0.0 
  without selection 18.3 0.0 0.0 
  grouped 31.5 0.0 0.0 
Georgia    
  benchmark 109.0 -8.4 1.4 
  without selection 68.3 -4.5 1.6 
  grouped 94.0 -6.6 1.1 
Note: Other exports are total exports to all other trade partners, and indicate the extent of trade diversion. 
 
Irrespective of the specification, a free trade agreement between China and Georgia is 
predicted to double exports from Georgia to China, and to lead to a cumulative increase of 
GDP per capita by about 1.5 percent. Assuming a fifteen year time horizon this would 
correspond to an average annual increase of Georgian exports to China of about five 
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percent. Assuming a shorter time horizon of only ten years this would correspond to an 
average annual increase of around eight percent. There is little trade diversion, as exports 
to other countries only slightly fall. 
 
Chinese exports to Georgia increase by only about 20 to 30 percent, with virtually no trade 
diversion or changes to real GDP per capita. For Georgia there is a significant difference 
between the specification with and the specification without the selection equation. This 
indicates that a significant part of the increase in Georgian exports in China is along the 
extensive margin, that is, Georgia diversifies its exports to China. 
 
These estimates exceed the CGE estimates of the feasibility study by almost an order of 
magnitude. There are several explanations. One, by construction the CGE model of the 
feasibility study focuses on tariff reductions alone, ignoring reductions in non-tariff barriers 
that are either negotiated or implied by the free trade agreement. Second, the CGE model 
ignores structural change, both the structural change that has taken place since the 2001 
base year of the underlying input-output table, and future structural change induced by the 
trade agreement. 
 
Importantly, the estimation is agnostic about the actual content of the proposed China-
Georgia free trade agreement and implicitly assumes that the free trade agreement and its 
economic effects will be similar to the average existing free trade agreement. This 
assumption is driven by the fact that at the moment the scope and depth of the proposed 
free trade agreement is completely unknown. Even if it would be known, it is difficult to 
rank and distinguish free trade agreements according to their depth, and to thus estimate 
the effects of different scopes and depths of free trade agreements. It is also not an 
unreasonable assumption, as even in a best case scenario the proposed free trade 
agreement is unlikely to be as deep as the DCFTA with the European Union or some of the 
larger and deeper free trade agreements such as NAFTA or the Eurasian Union. At the 
same time, the free trade agreement is also not likely to be as shallow as some of the older 
free trade agreements, such as the Georgia-Turkmenistan free trade agreement. 
 
14 
 
One stated objective of the proposed free trade agreement between China and Georgia is 
to leverage Georgia’s location between Europe and China and the existing DCFTA with the 
European Union. The estimations implicitly take into account the potential role of Georgia 
as a transit and processing hub, in as much as other countries are in a similar position. As 
the effect of trade agreements is taken to be the average over existing free trade 
agreements, the gravity estimates are underestimates if the proposed free trade 
agreement will focus on those areas that would further facilitate the transformation of 
Georgia to a transit and processing hub between China and Europe. 
 
While both free trade agreements would reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to exports to 
Europe respectively China, country of origin rules greatly limit the extent to which this dual 
preferential market access can be used to re-export goods from China to Europe. In 
contrast, processing of Chinese intermediate inputs in Georgia for export to the European 
Union would in principle be in compliance with country of origin rules. For this to happen, 
the proposed trade agreement has to be careful about country of origin rules, should 
contain investment provisions facilitating Chinese FDI in Georgia, and should coordinate 
trade facilitation measures with the provisions of the DCFTA. 
 
Left for future research are several issues that were not addressed in this paper. We did 
not address the effect of the proposed free trade agreement on trade in services and on 
foreign direct investment, as the available data is very limited. We also did not address the 
effect of the trade agreement on individual sectors. Estimating changes to trade flows for 
individual sectors is computationally demanding (and impossible for 141 countries) and 
requires a modification of the theoretical model underpinning the gravity equation. In 
particular, the few papers that attempt to estimate a multi-sector gravity equation assume 
away structural change induced by the trade agreement (Caliendo and Parro, 2015). This 
assumption is already problematic for mature, developed economies. It is unreasonable for 
Georgia, and assumes away one important channel through which trade agreements foster 
Georgia’s economic development. 
 
15 
 
On the other side, one of the advantages of our estimation strategy is that it includes not 
only tariff reductions, but also reductions in non-tariff barriers and the effect of changes in 
economic policy and economic structure induced by the free trade agreements. At the 
same time this is also a limitation, as it is not possible to disentangle these various 
channels and identify the contributions of tariff reductions, reductions in non-tariff barriers, 
policy changes, and structural change to the increase in trade flows and GDP. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Negotiations on the proposed China-Georgia free trade agreement have just begun. This 
paper hopes to inform these negotiations by providing rigorous quantitative estimates of 
the economic effects of the proposed free trade agreement. We find that the proposed free 
trade agreement will have strong effects on bilateral trade between China and Georgia, 
with minimal trade diversion, and a sizable impact on Georgian GDP per capita. A key 
feature of the econometric analysis is that it implicitly assumes that the proposed free trade 
agreement will be similar in scope and depth to other, existing free trade agreements. 
Should the proposed China-Georgia free trade agreement be deeper than the average 
existing trade agreement, these quantitative estimates will likely be underestimates. 
 
In consequence, the goal should be a free trade agreement that goes beyond mere tariff 
reductions. In particular, the free trade agreement should facilitate trade by reducing non-
tariff barriers, harmonizing country of origin rules with the country of origin rules in the 
DCFTA with the European Union, and should coordinate trade facilitation measures with 
the WTO trade facilitation agreement and the trade facilitation measures in the DCFTA. To 
facilitate Chinese FDI the free trade agreement should also update the existing Bilateral 
Investment Treaty between China and Georgia, by providing deeper investment provisions. 
The focus should be on reducing barriers to cross-border investment, while avoiding 
dispute settlement mechanisms that will lead to undue litigation. 
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The negotiations on the free trade agreement are not a means to an end. Rather, they 
create a collegial dialogue between China and Georgia, in various formats, from 
discussions among experts at a technical level to discussions among senior government 
officials. While the free trade agreement can potentially codify a wide range of issues, 
establishing a good working relationship would allow to address any issues that might arise 
in the future, and are not codified or have been anticipated. 
 
While the benefits of the proposed free trade agreement are substantial, they pale in 
comparison the benefits from further integration with the European Union or further 
regional integration in the South Caucasus and its immediate neighborhood. The China-
Georgia free trade agreement is thus an important, but not the most important project. 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
Table 6: Gravity Variables 
Variable Name Variable Type Description Source 
Exports  exports by sector at the HS 
two-digit level, in US$ 
UN Comtrade 
GDP  origin and destination country 
GDP, in current US$ 
World Bank WDI 
Distance  distance between the weighted 
average of the largest cities  
CEPII 
Land Border Dummy variable one if countries share a land 
border 
CEPII 
FTA Dummy variable one if countries are part of a 
free trade agreement 
WTO RTA 
Language Dummy variable one if countries share the 
same language 
CEPII 
Colony Dummy variable one if countries have colonial 
ties/were once in the same 
country 
CEPII 
Sectoral share  Sectoral share in value -added UNIDO 
GDP per capita Selection variable origin country GDP per capita, 
in US$ 
World Bank WDI 
Legal origin Selection variable one if countries share the 
same legal origin 
CEPII 
Doing Business index Selection variable Trading across borders index World Bank 
 
